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ABSTRACT
How can we justify the validity of our computer security methods?
This meta-methodological question is related to recent explorations
on the science of computer security, which have been hindered
by computer security’s unique properties. We confront this by
developing a taxonomy of properties andmethods. Interdisciplinary
foundations provide a solid grounding for a set of essential concepts,
including a decision tree for characterizing adversarial interaction.
Several types of invalidation and general ways of addressing them
are described for technical methods. An interdisciplinary argument
from theory explains the role that meta-methodological validation
plays in the adversarial science of computer security.
KEYWORDS
Foundations of cyber security, methodology, adversarial human
behavior
1 INTRODUCTION
If we’re developing a new security system, theory or technique,
how can we be sure that we are in fact increasing our security? We
might develop a metric, but then how do we justify that metric? In
general, how do we know if we’re using the right methods?
In computer security, such meta-methodological questions have
a long history of being considered [29][49][64][80, pg.v] and are
part of the search for a foundational science or theory [19][33][50].
Developing such a science is complicated by several issues [35],
such as the fact that we in security have adversaries who might
invalidate any solution we propose, and that our technological
environment is continually changing.
To address this challenging problem we need de￿nitions rigor-
ous enough to support formal, empirical, and technical methods.
We will work in computer security’s tradition of using taxonomies
for concepts and classi￿cations [4][42][44]. This paper is particu-
larly inspired by the approach of “Basic Concepts and Taxonomy
of Dependable and Secure Computing,” [4] which exempli￿es the
value of securing a solid foundation for addressing di￿cult tech-
nical problems. However, while that paper describes “attributes”
of security such as con￿dentiality and integrity, it does not de-
scribe the properties of security that complicate meta-methodology.
Likewise, that paper describes “means” such as veri￿cation and
recovery, it does not describe the methods in terms of distinguish-
ing technical methods from other methods that provide context
we can use for validation. In fact, we know of no taxonomy that
characterizes computer security in the way that we need. So this
paper will center on deriving these underdeveloped characteristics
as shown in Figure 1; this will help us clarify the di￿cult questions
about validating methods.
In Section 2wewill de￿ne a set of properties of cyber security and
describe their interrelation. In Section 3 we will de￿ne several types
of methods in cyber security and describe how they in￿uence each
other. We will also see at a general level what types of actions are
needed to validate a technical method. Finally in Section 4 we will
describe procedures for validating theoretical methods. At every
step we will adapt existing concepts from a variety of disciplines
so as not to ‘re-invent the wheel.’
From here on we will use the term cyber, which has been used in
terms such as cyberspace and cyber security, to refer to computers,
electronic communication systems, and related technical infrastruc-
ture systems [15, pg. 60]. Although this term is relatively new, it
has the advantage of being technology-neutral. Over the coming
decades, our technical environment may move away from tradi-
tional computers and networks, while keeping the fundamental
attributes of controlling, communicating machines. We seek an-
swers that will remain relevant beyond our immediate technological
environment.
2 PROPERTIES OF CYBER SECURITY
As with all disciplines, cyber security possesses a set of distinctive
properties. Herley and van Oorschot [35, pg.107] warn against
using these properties as an excuse to avoid identifying a coherent
scienti￿c approach. However, this paper is not making such an
excuse; instead, it is using cyber security’s unique properties to
suggest and constrain meta-methodology. As shown in Figure 1,
cyber security is Adversarial, Mechanistic, and Contextual.
2.1 Adversarial
By de￿nition, the existence of an intelligent adversary is inherent
to cyber security.
There are numerous de￿nitions of cyber security and they often
justify this assertion implicitly. For example, the de￿nition “Cyber
security refers generally to the ability to control access to the net-
worked systems and the information they contain,” [6, pg.1] implies
the existence of something capable of accessing the systems and
information against our wishes. Likewise, “Security is a composite
of the attributes of con￿dentiality, integrity, and availability” [4,
pg.13] implies an entity which could break that con￿dentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability. Section 3.3 and Section 4 describe reasons
for relying on foundational de￿nitions in this way, and some of the
dangers of doing so. For now, of the three properties we will spend
the most time on the adversarial, as it is foundational.
To explore the adversarial property, we will use as a point of
reference the work of contemporary science historian Peter Galison,
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Figure 1: A Taxonomy of Characteristics of Cyber Security
who used several theoretical ideas from post-World War 2 control-
theorist1 Norbert Wiener. Galison presented his ideas to the JASON
government advisory group for their 2010 report on ‘Science of
Cyber-Security’ [38], and also as a keynote to a 2012 science of
security workshop [25].
Galison adapted terminology from Wiener to identify an ad-
versarial science2 as one that involves an “active oppositional
intelligence” [24, pg.232] who in Wiener’s words “is determined
on victory and will use any trick of craftiness or dissimulation to
obtain this victory” [24, pg.231]. Galison suggests cyber security is
one such adversarial science [25], along with game theory, control
theory, and military operations research [24, pg.232]. In contrast,
non-adversarial sciences such as Biology and Chemistry involve
overcoming “chance and disorder” [24, pg.231] including a mere
lack of knowledge.
We expand upon their basic distinction to consider three descrip-
tions of adversarial disciplines. A discipline practitioner can interact
with their adversary, each trying to disrupt the other’s mission3,
but a practitioner can also work to accomplish their mission in
1Wiener self-identi￿ed as a cyberneticist, referring to the science of control, which he
founded. We use the term ‘control theory’ to avoid confusion between cybernetics and
cyber security. In prior work we discuss the importance of control in characterizing
adversarial cyber security interactions [63].
2Wiener and Galison use the terms ‘Manichean’ for adversarial and ‘Augustinian’
for non-adversarial, which resonate aesthetically but which potentially obscure their
meanings.
3Where amission is a task that is carried out during an operation [15].
the presence of an adversary without directly attacking their adver-
sary’s mission, or merely theorize about adversaries without the
theorizing being part of an adversarial interaction.
First, the term adversary interactive describes a discipline in
which the discipline practitioner and their adversary each attempt
to disrupt the other’s mission.
An example from cyber security is in attack-defense “capture
the ￿ag” exercises. The nature of these events vary, but a typical
one is described by Cowan et al. [12]: participating teams share a
computer network and score points by maintaining a server that
provides a service which is known to be vulnerable to exploitation.
Participating teams can also score points by exploiting that service
while it is being run on their adversaries’ servers. So all participating
teams are adversaries of each other.
A non-cyber example of adversary interaction is in “active de-
fense” criminal trials, in which defending and prosecuting lawyers
each attempt to establish narratives regarding the defendant while
attacking the validity of the other lawyer’s narrative.
Second, the term adversary present describes a discipline in
which an adversary attempts to disrupt a discipline practitioner’s
mission. The practitioner does not attack their adversary.
As an example from cyber security, the JASON group ultimately
understood cyber security to be “science in the presence of ad-
versaries” [38, pg 15], a formulation that seems to be shaped by
cryptography [38, pg 2], which is about “communication in the
presence of adversaries” [62, §2]. For example, communications
that aspire to privacy de￿ne an adversary and their capabilities.
The adversary may observe encrypted messages, or observe exam-
ple encrypted messages with their unencrypted versions, or the
adversary may have access to a version of the cryptographic sys-
tem [62, §6.3.1]. The goals of protecting against the adversary can
then be used to produce a formal and provable characterization
of security. The issue of importance here is that the adversary is
attacking the discipline practitioner’s privacy, but the practitioner
is not attacking the adversary back.
As a non-cyber security example, in academic peer review ideas
are “attacked” to seek ￿aws, and while the scholar being reviewed
may provide defenses and justi￿cations, they are generally not
expected to attack the reviewers back.
Third, an adversary modeling discipline involves developing
a representation or theory about an adversarial relationship. The
theorist does not participate in that relationship.
As a non-cyber example, consider an ecologist studying lynx-
hare population dynamics in the wild [57]. Clearly such a predator-
prey system is adversarial, but while the lynxes and hares are ad-
versaries of each other, they are not adversaries of the ecologist.
As a cyber example, consider Nguyen et al.’s application of Stack-
elberg games to security problems [52]. This work is motivated by
particular speci￿ed use cases, but the focus is on developing gen-
eral methods and principles. At one extreme, game theoretic e￿orts
such as von Neumann’s seminal paper [79] may have no identi￿able
applications to a speci￿c adversary. At the other extreme, even the
theoretical papers can be used in adversary interactive contexts.
We need a way to distinguish between adversary modeling and
adversary interactive descriptions.
Figure 2: Characterizing Methods by Invalidation
So we have de￿ned several adversarial descriptions. But how
can we determine the right description for a method?
We begin by considering howWiener describes adversarial meth-
ods:
The distinction between the passive resistance of na-
ture and the active resistance of an opponent suggests
a distinction between the research scientist and the
warrior or the game player. The research physicist has
all the time in the world to carry out his experiments,
and he need not fear that nature will in time discover
his tricks and method and change her policy. [81, pg
36]
In Wiener’s non-adversarial setting, nature is not attempting to
disrupt the research physicist’s mission, so the physicist’s task is
easier. They have “all the time in the world” to carry out their ex-
periments and, presumably, to validate their experimental methods.
But in Wiener’s adversarial setting, the adversary will undermine
the methods of the warriors and game players. This adversary will
do so by observing the “tricks and methods” used and intentionally
invalidating them.
We call this the vulnerability property of methods: the ex-
tent to which an adversary can intentionally invalidate a method’s
ability to support a mission, for a de￿ned perspective and scope.
We can use this to determine an adversarial description, as shown
in Figure 2. First, we de￿ne a vulnerability criterion: is the method
vulnerable to an adversary?
If the vulnerability criterion is met, we then ask if the method
is part of an e￿ort to disrupt the mission of that adversary who
is invalidating it. If so, then the method is described as adversary
interactive; if not, then it is adversary present.
If the vulnerability criterion is not met, then we ask if the subject
of the method’s e￿ort is an adversarial interaction. If so, then the
method is described as adversary modeling; if not, then it is non-
adversarial.
The vulnerability property is de￿ned “for a de￿ned perspective
and scope” because adversarial descriptions are relative to their
circumstance of use.
In terms of perspective, consider a terrorist who mails explosive
devices to university scholars. Any scholar could become the target
of such an attacker, but it does not follow that all scholarly methods
are inherently adversarial. Rather, this introduces the subjective
aspect of adversariality: that an adversarial characteristic is lim-
ited by perspective. From the terrorist’s perspective, the scholars
may indeed all be part of a political or cultural con￿ict. From the
scholars’ perspectives, this may not be the case. Therefore there are
at least two subjective interpretations of the adversarial situation.
The terrorist’s perspective may seem more comprehensive, but
consider a third-party intelligence operative who is observing this
activity, unbeknown to the terrorist and scholar. This third party’s
perspective is even more comprehensive.
In terms of scope, consider a truck that is speeding through a
combat zone, occasionally swerving to avoid any possible enemies.
An enemy aircraft is tracking the truck unbeknown to it, waiting for
the right shot. In this encounter-level scope, the truck is adversary
present. But if the truck is carrying munitions to an anti-aircraft
weapon that is tracking the enemy aircraft, then in this operation-
level scope the truck is adversary interactive.
We conclude this subsection with some additional examples.
Example 1: adversarial shift. Consider an ecologist studying lynx-
hare interactions for purposes of maintaining stable populations in
a wildlife preserve. In this ecologist’s context, their studies are ad-
versary modeling. If a cyber security researcher read the ecologist’s
studies and applied its theoretical insights to an active cyber con￿ict,
then this use would be adversary interactive. The opponent targeted
by this method might also read the ecologist’s studies and change
their policy to invalidate their use, but this would only invalidate
the ecological studies’ adversarial application, not their original
use. This is because the opponent is only targeting the adversarial
adaptation of ecological methods, not the original ecological use of
the methods.
Fancifully, the opponent may even decide to disrupt the ecolo-
gist’s studies, perhaps secretly corrupting the ecologist’s data to
ultimately mislead the security researcher. Such a disruption would
be in the scope of the adversarial use of the ecological methods. The
ecologist, focused on their scope of lynxes and hares, may neverthe-
less be confused by the unexpected data. This confusion is due to
their subjective perspective, and is a result of the adversarial shift
that occurred when their methods moved from a non-adversarial
to an adversary interactive use. The security researcher might thus
inform the ecologist that their methods are being used adversari-
ally, and that validating a vulnerable method involves considering its
invalidation by an intelligent adversary.
At this point, the ecologist could reject the cyber security context,
and try to return to the scope of their adversary modeling studies.
But even then, they would be wise to change their methodology
to protect their data from any further interference, in the same
way that they might protect their credit card data for example.
A well-constructed methodology in this case would be adversary
present, since it would be on guard against any possible adversary.
Alternately, the ecologist might become enraged by the threat to
their research and dedicate themselves to the con￿ict, focusing their
e￿orts not only on protecting their data but on producing studies
that assist the cyber security researcher in their con￿ict. In this
case, the ecologist would have adversary interactive methods.
Example 2: intentionality and the vulnerability property.Abotanist’s
studies of ￿ora in a wildlife park are adversary present, because to
complete their studies the botanists need to maintain their safety
in the presence of predators such as tigers. The botanist may also
need to maintain their safety during any ￿oods that may happen,
but the ￿oods will not invalidate their e￿orts intentionally in the
same way a tiger will. If the botanist stays within a radius of high
ground and shelter, the ￿ood will not seek some way of overcoming
this. But if the botanist stays within a radius of a safe truck, the
tiger may learn to stealthily creep between the botanist and the
truck before attacking. Likewise, a natural disaster will not damage
a network as methodically as a malicious human attacker can.
This is the ￿rst type of intentionality: the purposeful, reactive
nature of the attack, which might be formally represented with a
Belief-Desire-Intention [68, §4.2.1] or similar model. This type of
intentionality is part of what makes the adversary intelligent, and
is part of the vulnerability property of methods.
The second type of intentionality relates to whether the tiger
intends to stop the botanist from examining the ￿ora. In other
words, was the vulnerable mission in question – the study of the
￿ower in this case – the intended target of invalidation? In fact,
the tiger attacks the botanist out of hunger rather than a ￿erce
determination to save the ￿ora from examination. The tiger does
not care about the botanist’s mission, any more than a network
intruder cares about the many missions of people whose tra￿c they
are sni￿ng (and con￿dentiality they are violating) while searching
for a particular target. This second type of intentionality is not a
necessary part of the vulnerability property of methods, although it
characterizes the adversarial relationship in terms of the particular
missions that are in con￿ict.
Example 3: subjective e￿ects on adversarial characterizations. Con-
sider a network intruder who is illicitly sni￿ng tra￿c for ￿nancial
information. If a legitimate user of that network decides to encrypt
their email out of a nonspeci￿c wish for privacy, they are not at-
tacking the mission of that speci￿c intruder, but rather, of any such
intruder. Likewise, that intruder is not attacking the con￿dentiality-
preserving mission of that speci￿c user, but of any such user. So
they are in an adversary present relationship with each other.
If the intruder decides to target that user and bypasses their
encryption implementation by installing a keylogger on the user’s
workstation, then the intruder has entered an adversary interactive
relation with the user, while the user is still adversary present.
The intruder may assume that the network’s administrator is
logging various types of activity and scanning various ￿les for
malware. The intruder and the admin are attacking the missions of
any such adversary. So they are in an adversary present relationship
with each other.
Imagine the admin detects the keylogger and begins to carefully
monitor their network tra￿c. The admin is reacting to the intruder’s
actions, so the admin is adversary interactive with the intruder,
though the intruder is still adversary present.
The admin noti￿es the user about the keylogger, so the user
begins using a di￿erent workstation and email account; that user
is now also adversary interactive, because they are reacting to that
speci￿c intruder’s actions.
Eventually the admin and user may believe the intruder’s soft-
ware has been removed from their machines, so they once again
assume they are adversary present. The intruder, having noticed the
keylogger removal and the email account change, is now adversary
interactive and is planning their next move.
In this way the adversarial relationship iteratively changes, and
the engineered context changes with it. The next two sections
describe this.
2.2 Mechanistic
Cyber security involves both engineered and natural aspects, but is
dominated by the engineered.
In this context ‘engineered’ and ‘natural’ are de￿ned in terms
of the mechanistic approach in philosophy of science, as applied to
computer security by Hatleback and Spring [34] [70].
Mechanisms are organized entities and activities that produce
regular changes in a process [34, pg 443] [47, cited]; a de￿nition
that supports a philosophical perspective on the sciences. Hatle-
back and Spring use this to distinguish between engineered and
natural mechanisms in computer science, and in computer security.
Engineered mechanisms are arti￿cial, such as DNS schemes and
DNS cache poisoning attacks, and natural mechanisms relate to
the physical world (and are thus also called physical mechanisms),
such as the cognitive aspects of human-computer interaction [34,
pg 444-446]. This is contrasted with an engineering vs. scienti￿c
distinction [65], which precludes the possibility of considering a
scienti￿c approach to its engineering aspect and which lacks the
clear connection to the mechanisms involved [34, pg 445-446]. A
similar argument can be made against distinctions such as research
vs. development [3] or applied research vs. basic research [14].
The engineered mechanisms are those which can be changed [34,
pg 445], and both sides of the adversarial interaction will change
the engineered environment to further their mission and impede
the other’s mission.
For cyber security, the engineered environment is the set of
all implemented mechanisms. It is constantly changing because of
the security struggle as well as due to the evolution of technology.
A struggle takes place in the engineered environment, each partici-
pant seeking to gain control of the environment and to modify it to
their bene￿t. Although the natural mechanisms cannot be changed,
they act as constraints in which the struggle takes place, and the
adversary that understands them best will be best positioned to
maneuver around them.
Generally speaking, if two participants are in con￿ict in an engi-
neered environment, one participant will modify the environment
until it is suitable enough for their needs, at which point the other
participant will do the same, and so on. This creates an endless
adversarial cycle. In cyber security this has been called an “arms
race” [17] [53] [72], a “cat and mouse game” [18] [23], or a game
of “whack-a-mole” [2] [13] [66]. The cyber security methods that
are relevant to one iteration of the cycle may not be relevant to the
following cycle. In fact, a competent adversary will ensure that this
is the case.
2.3 Contextual
Cyber security is contextual: characterized by the state of the
adversarial con￿ict, and the state of the engineered environment,
for a particular time and place.
The context is de￿ned by the adversarial state: what each partic-
ipant is doing, what their plans are, what they hope to achieve, and
by the engineering state: what the combatants are struggling for con-
trol over, who currently controls what aspect of the environment,
and how much each side understands of the situation.
Because this context is adversarial, its exact state cannot be
known with certainty. Consider a security practitioner who wants
to know if a USB drive contains malware. Perhaps they study it
with a software tool. But how do they know if the tool, or the
operating system it runs on, is not infected in such a way as to de-
ceive them? Perhaps they install the operating system directly from
the manufacturer, and compile the tool from source code without
connecting to the internet. But how do they know if the compiler,
operating system, or even hardware were not compromised with
malware by the manufacturer, by an insider threat perhaps? Even
if the practitioner were able to construct their own hardware from
sand and plastic and write their own tool in binary, they still might
make a design or programming mistake enabling a malicious ex-
ploit. Of course practically speaking at some point the practitioner
is satis￿ed enough with the relative safety of their tools to proceed
with their analysis, but the fact remains that their sense of secu-
rity has no absolute foundation. In Section 3.3 we will see similar
epistemological regress problems.
Not only is context changed by the adversary, but it also evolves
under the pressure of consumer demand, business product creation,
software and hardware innovations by entrepreneurs, and so on.
So the context changes in unpredictable ways. As time goes on,
the amount of change increases. And a method that was valid at
one point in time may not be valid in another. That likelihood of
contextual invalidation increases as time goes on.
To consider ways of managing this, we will consider the types
of cyber security methods involved.
3 METHODS IN CYBER SECURITY
For our focus on validating methods, we will consider the three
types of methods involved in cyber security shown in Figure 1:
Technical, Operational, and Theoretical.
Because the engineered environment of any particular problem
varies, one set of methods relates to solving problems related to the
current engineered environment. These are the technical methods.
And because the adversary and the state of the adversarial strug-
gle vary, one set of methods relates to deploying those technical
resources to achieve goals in the current adversarial context. These
are the operational methods.
Finally, confronted by seemingly endless adversarial cycles, cyber
security practitioners occasionally see the need to systematize their
discipline or to generalize problems across contexts. So one set
of methods relates to exploring the theory and the science of the
discipline. These are the theoretical methods.
In Section 3.1 we describe ways of validating technical methods.
This includes considering operational invalidation, so we describe
operational methods in Section 3.2. However, the technical vali-
dation methods are meta-methods, which themselves need to be
validated. Some basic concepts to do so are described in Section 3.3,
and validating such meta-methods is described in Section 4.
3.1 Technical Methods and their Validation
We need not develop a taxonomy of technical methods because
such taxonomies already exist in the form of the ACS Computing
Classi￿cation System, for example. Instead, we will note that the
continually changing engineered environment provides an endless
source of technical problems to be solved by security practition-
ers. Although this creates an exciting amount of interesting work,
it is also inherently problematic: having implemented a techni-
cal method and having tested for technical invalidation (e.g. by
performing unit tests, processing sample data, etc.) the security
practitioner is often encouraged to hurry on to the next technical
problem, without systematically validating the method.
This includes validating against adversarial invalidation: that
a method has been undermined or counteracted by the antagonist
and is no longer as useful, as described in Section 2.1. Beyond the
e￿orts of an adversary, contextual invalidation can also occur
when natural technological innovation changes the engineered
environment in a way that the technical method is no longer usable,
as described in Section 2.3.
A ￿nal type of danger is indicated by our use of the term “inval-
idation.” The vulnerability property in Section 2.1 referred to the
invalidation of a method’s ability “to support a mission.” A method
that is useful for one mission (and the operation that it is a part
of) may not be useful for another. So operational invalidation
occurs when a mission is not conducive to the e￿ective use of a
particular method.
Table 1: Validating Technical Methods
Invalidation Validation
technical varies per sub-discipline
adversarial
contextual identify, detect, react
operational
We have identi￿ed a set of potential invalidations, but now we
cannot provide a normative and universal set of validations, for
several reasons. First, the properties of cyber security guarantee
that such a set of validations would themselves risk adversarial
or contextual invalidation. Second, the details of validating, for
example, an adversary present cryptographic method in one era
are likely to be much di￿erent from the details of validating an
adversary interactive network defense method in another era. And
third, exploring the many di￿erent types of validation is a task that
should be performed on solid foundations, which this paper is part
of the process of establishing.
As a point of contrast, technical validations (i.e. demonstrations
that the engineered aspects of the method work as designed) vary
by method and sub-discipline because they are more established: in
some cases they require a proof and in other cases a user study, for
example. Adversarial, contextual, and operational validations are
not as established for the reasons described in the previous para-
graph. So instead we will specify what a validation should accom-
plish. The validation should identify the ways in which the invali-
dation could happen: for example, by determining what contextual
developments invalidate the technical method’s assumptions, or by
specifying the operational parameters (such as assumptions, use
cases, and potential misuses) required by the method. The valida-
tion should describe ways to detect when such an invalidation has
actually occurred, in terms of sensors or logs, for example. The
validation should also describe how to react upon detecting an in-
validation: how is damage mitigated? What is the next iteration of
the adversarial cycle?
3.2 Operational Methods
The previous section argued that technical methods in cyber se-
curity are ultimately used to support operations.4 So we should be
speci￿c about the types of operations we are talking about. We will
use a taxonomy derived from Rid [61] which as shown in Figure 1
includes Criminal, Political Violence, and Military categories. We
will consider methods related to all participants in the adversarial
struggle: for example, both criminal methods and law enforcement
methods. Of course we do not condone criminal methods, but to
understand the con￿ict we must understand the crime, and be able
to describe the threat.
3.2.1 Criminal. This category of operation is the one most peo-
ple are likely to encounter, as it involves illegal activity between
individuals and organizations, not nations or insurgent groups
which wish to defeat nations. Political violence or military activity
may break international norms or even international law, and there-
fore be considered crimes, but for our purposes we will consider
an activity criminal if it is breaking a nation’s laws and it primarily
involves victims within that nation.
Criminal methods include ransomware, identity theft, and other
cases of stealing from businesses [76] and individuals. Methods
against criminal activities include “computer safety” approaches,
as well as security procedures both by organizations and by home
computer users [36]. This can range from help desk scripts (which
might begin with, for example, “did you try rebooting?”) to gov-
ernment guidelines and suggestions for businesses [74], to digital
forensic methods used when bringing criminals to trial [10].
4This is unlike technical methods in non-adversarial sciences, which are used to develop
theories – to provide evidence for theories, or to falsify theories, or to compare theories,
depending on the epistemological commitments of the practitioners. See Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Political Violence. This involves con￿ict between nations
or insurgent groups, as opposed to individuals or organizations.
Political violence includes espionage, sabotage, and information
operations.
The goal of cyber espionage is “to capture data of the opposing
force” and includes “ex￿ltration, monitoring, and theft of digital
information.” [69, pg 114-115] These operations may be “advanced
persistent threats” by highly-skilled teams whose work is di￿cult
to detect [48].
Cyber sabotage operations involve, for example, attacks on na-
tional infrastructure such as industrial control systems and power
grids [69, ch. 11-12].
Finally, the understanding of information operations varies some-
what by country [28]. In the U.S. its purpose is to “in￿uence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries” [15, pg. 115]
but is sometimes known as “in￿uence campaigns” [43], “strategic
messaging” [39, pg. 24], or “information warfare” [31]. Information
Operations have been carried out by Russia [55] based on well-
developed theories [22], as well as by China [8] [11, pgs 23-25],
Israel and their antagonists Hezbollah and Hamas [69, Chapter 4],
and ISIS [40].
3.2.3 Military. As explored by Rattray and Healey [60], these
include situations that overlap with political violence as well as
those that purely support kinetic action. The U.S. military produces
a large number of documents on operational methods, and also
has a strong tradition in developing technical methods to support
operations as well as for acquisitions [27] [58]; these methods are
gradually being adapted to cyber security [26] [46].
3.3 Theoretical Methods
Cyber security as a ￿eld is by necessity very focused on its immedi-
ate context. Even so, practitioners occasionally ask: how good of a
job am I doing at this? and: will I always just be “putting out ￿res”?
In recent years, security researchers have sought such theoretical
methods, hoping to ￿nd fundamental principles to drive innovation
and to predict the e￿ectiveness of technical tools and operational
policies [45][50][67]. Security researchers have looked to physical
and social sciences for universal laws and considered whether these
laws will follow rather than inspire security solutions [19][41].
Several studies suggest improvements to methodology [51][64]
and scienti￿c reporting [9], and describe the nature of scienti￿c
claims [33] [75], but no consensus has yet developed [35].
This paper is motivated by these types of questions. As a point
of approach, we are considering the validation of methods. In collo-
quial terms, we may ask: how do I know if my security methods
are any good? More formally, ameta-methodology is an “inves-
tigation into principles of method and their justi￿cation” [54, pg.
80]. We use the term validation as a synonym for justi￿cation. Sec-
tion 3.1 included one such validation, summarized in adversary
present 1.
Every method has a meta-methodology; if it is completely un-
explored, it may be called “more art than science,” “a black magic,”
“artisanal,” or “tradecraft,” suggesting that the method is validated
by an expert on a case-by-case basis, usually after trial-and-error.
Ameta-methodology5 includes an epistemology, an ontology, and
a theory of explanation.
Epistemology involves “the nature and justi￿cation of valid
knowledge [and] the procedures by which models or explanations
are constructed.” [7, pg. 54] As an example of why this might be
useful, consider that to validate a methodology we seek a meta-
methodology. But this leads us to ask whether to validate a meta-
methodology we should seek a meta-meta-methodology. Which in
turn requires a meta-meta-meta-methodology and so on. Informal
discourse and popular science often use the imagery of “turtles
all the way down” [82] but in philosophy this is an epistemologi-
cal regress problem [71, §3.3], which has been addressed since the
time of ancient Greece. Resolutions include foundationalism, in
which some beliefs are assumed (e.g. as with mathematical ax-
ioms); coherentism, which requires that assumed beliefs be part of a
su￿ciently-comprehensive system of beliefs, and in￿nitism, which
accepts the in￿nite regress [21].
Additional epistemological questions include debates on the ex-
istence of a universal scienti￿c method, and whether such a method
should allow induction, or focus on validation or falsi￿cation [1].
Ontology “seeks to describe the basic categories and relation-
ships of existence thereby providing an account of the types of
things there are and the manner (or mode) of their being” [7, pg.
54]. For example, this paper makes ontological commitments regard-
ing the properties of cyber security and has explicitly characterized
adversarial interactions with a decision tree.
Explanation is a way of making “claims that go beyond our
experiences and purport to discover underlying causes.” [7, pg. 54]
This is the aspect that creates understanding and allows prediction.
In cyber security, this is di￿cult due to the vulnerability property of
methods: any explanation is subject to invalidation by an adversary
or by the evolving engineered environment.
The next section will summarize the challenges faced by cyber
security meta-methodologies, and suggest ways of managing those
challenges.
4 VALIDATING META-METHODS
For most security practitioners, the validation of technical methods
in Section 3.1 will su￿ce. But to be comprehensive, we also need
to consider the validation of meta-methods.
In cyber security, meta-methods are also vulnerable to adversar-
ial and contextual invalidation. An adversary who learns of a given
meta-method can in principle seek to modify the engineered envi-
ronment, and can change their operational plans to invalidate that
meta-method. Worse, at any given moment a security practitioner
cannot be sure of the extent to which an adversary has already
invalidated their methods and meta-methods.
For example, imagine that a researcher builds a system that
measures the security of a system. The researcher wonders how
they can be sure that their system works well. In other words,
their system is a technical method, and they want a theoretical
meta-method for validating their system.
5This formulation is adapted from Bevir’s [7] consideration of the meta-methodology
of political science. We do not mean to suggest that using these terms should be
mandatory for security professionalism. Rather, these terms are born from well-studied
disciplines that can be helpful in resolving di￿cult questions in theoretical methods.
Imagine that the researcher decides to use data to test the system,
so they collect data from operational systems. Immediately they are
confronted with a number of questions: how do they ￿nd a “ground
truth” about whether the data they collected is in fact secure or
not? How do they know if the engineered environment will change
in ways that make the data obsolete? How do they know if an
adversary will discover their system, and change the engineered
environment or their behavior in a way that will circumvent the
system without the researcher realizing it? Because if the adversary
does so, then they have invalidated the researcher’s meta-method.
So, simply by asking “how do I know if it works well,” the re-
searcher has found themselves in a dizzying theoretical environ-
ment, assailed by adversarial invalidation, on the precipice of a
regression (what meta-method should validate their meta-methods,
etc.), gingerly but inevitably heading towards a never-ending ad-
versarial cycle.
But now we have surveyed the properties and the methods of
cyber security. So consider the validation of technical methods de-
scribed in Section 3.1 and summarized in Table 1. That validation
is a meta-method, and thus itself vulnerable to invalidation, or a
regress of meta-methods. But now we have three well-studied epis-
temological approaches to resolving this regress. And we have the
operational methods of Section 3.2, each with its own tradition,
with more or less technological sophistication, of validating meth-
ods and making decisions in adversarial environments. And indeed,
we can seek further guidance in these adversarial disciplines.
For example, law enforcement forensic sciences are familiar with
criminal e￿orts to invalidate their methods, and havemanaged ques-
tions about the validity of new digital forensics techniques [10] [37].
Another example is strategic theory, which considers war and po-
litical violence, as well as the national security impacts of crime [5].
It considers con￿ict that is adversarial by de￿nition, engineered [30,
pgs. 38-40], and contextual [32, pg 43]. It is built on a substantial
history of operations and technical methods [58] [27], which serve
as material for debates on whether there are universal laws and
methods of con￿ict [32] [56] [77].
We are not saying that cyber security should be addressed purely
from the perspective of strategic theory, the forensic sciences, or
any other operational discipline. But security is interdisciplinary,
and we can productively look across disciplines for methodological
inspiration. In Section 4.1 we will give an example of this, using
Clausewitzian critical analysis from strategic theory6. After that
in Section 4.2 we will describe some of the characteristics of this
interdisciplinary methodological endeavor.
4.1 Critical Analysis as a Performative
Meta-Method
Clausewitz considered the relation between critical analysis, theory,
andwar7. His basic argument is that while it may be possible to have
a doctrine for how to “organize, plan, and conduct an engagement,”
we cannot come up with a static set of rules or doctrine to conduct
war in general, across time. Instead, theory should study “ends and
6In strategic theory texts it has been noted that “because Clausewitz said something
did not necessarily make it true, but it did make it worth considering.” [5, pgs.13].
7Unless otherwise stated, the description and quotes in this subsection are taken from
Book 2 Chapters 2-6 of On War [78].
means” and their related factors. The way this is done is through
critical analysis, where the word critical is used in the sense of
critique rather than criticism.
Clausewitz describes critical analysis as having three parts.
(1) Identi￿cation of facts
(2) Determination of causes of the facts
(3) Investigation of the means used and the intentions behind
their use
We will explore this in terms of the parts of a meta-methodology
as described in Section 3.3.
Epistemologically, knowledge is constructed through a study of
past incidents in part 1, and continuing through and analysis of
“relationships between phenomena” in parts 2 and 3. The analyst
also has to consider “what might have happened” as well as what
actually happened.
Determining causality in the second part can be extremely chal-
lenging so there are bound to be gaps, but “all a theory demands is
that investigation should be resolutely carried on till such a gap is
reached. At that point, judgment has to be suspended.”
Clausewitz discusses several additional challenges in determin-
ing causes throughout the process. In describing how analysis of
causes and intentions work together,
“we can follow a chain of sequential objectives until
we reach that one that requires no justi￿cation, be-
cause its necessity is self-evident. In many cases, par-
ticularly those involving great and decisive actions,
the analysis must extend to the ultimate objective,
which is to bring about peace.”
In this way Clausewitz resolves the regress foundationally.
The second and third parts of the process require a “working
theory” to be useful, but the aim of the analysis should not be
a “mechanical application of theory.” Instead, the theory should
be tools to help the analyst in their judgments. If the analyst is
studying a con￿ict and one of the combatants acts contrary to the
“principles, rules, and methods” of the working theory, the analyst
should investigate the reasons for this, and the analyst “has no
right to appeal to theoretical principles unless these reasons are
inadequate.” If that contrary behavior ends in failure, the analyst
should not automatically assume that the unexpected behavior was
what caused the failure. Likewise, if that contrary behavior ends
in success, the analyst should not assume that the working theory
was incorrect. The role of the theory is not to provide “laws and
standards” but “￿ndings” that assist in the analyst’s “judgment.”
Ontologically, the analysis is made of historical facts (individuals,
units, events, actions), the causal chains of those events, and a de-
scription of those events in terms of the means that the belligerents
used, and the intentions behind those selected means. Furthermore,
they should be described in terms of operational language: “the
language of criticism should have the same character as thinking
must have in wars,” so that the analysis retain its practical value.
The theory of explanation is provided by the ￿nal analysis of
causes and means which the analyst has constructed.
However, producing the explanatory analysis is not the only
product of this process.
“Critical analysis being the application of theoretical
truths to actual events, it not only reduces the gap
between the two but also accustoms the mind to these
truths through their repeated application.”
Not only is theory changed by the critical analysis, but it is meant
to prepare the analyst for future, unexpected contexts. “[Theory]
is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more
accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him
to the battle￿eld.” Which is not to claim that all guidelines should
be rejected: it is acceptable if “the theorist’s studies automatically
result in principles and rules,” but theory is “never to construct an
algebraic formula for use on the battle￿eld. Even these principles
and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of
reference... rather than to serve as a guide.”
In other words, critical analysis is performative: the fact that
the analyst is performing it is as important as the conclusions they
reach, and performing it during an action is its own validation.
After all, any pre-action theoretical conclusions may be invalidated
by the adversary in the next operation. Because adversarial op-
erations are so context-dependent, rather than simply learning
rules about what to do, the combatant should learn how to solve
problems in real-time, with theory to provide a guiding “frame
of reference.” Critical analysis gives them practice in the skills of
producing causal explanations, questioning theories when needed.
This is what Clausewitz calls “creative ability” in war.
To describe this in terms we have introduced previously, the
methods related to the “engagement” described at the beginning
of this subsection are analogous to technical methods in cyber
security: when related to “material factors,” this type of military
creativity is less necessary. But there is a level at which “the intellect
alone is decisive,” and methods at this level are validated through
critical analysis: before the action as training, during the action as
decision-making, and after the action as preparation for the next
event.
4.2 Interdisciplinary Generative Meta-Methods
It would be self-contradictory to o￿er a single way of validating
meta-methods. We have described meta-methodology as vulnerable
to invalidation by adversarial action or context.We therefore bene￿t
from generative meta-methods: ways of developing additional
methods.
Consider the demands that we place on meta-methods. They
must validate our methods while themselves avoiding invalidation,
they must manage regress problems, and they should avoid ad-
versarial cycles. Ideally they should work universally, but because
of the cyber security’s contextual property we will usually need
to be satis￿ed with a way of telling when the theoretical method
becomes invalidated or obsolete.
We have earlier described security as interdisciplinary, so we
will once again seek inspiration across disciplines. This paper has
already made use of philosophy, which is one of the humanities.
Consider: in many contemporary views, humanist meaning does
not equal objective truth but represents an attempt to explore, to
“problematize”, to create thought experiments, etc. In a way, this
is chasing the in￿nite regress: asking questions, which are then
questioned, which are themselves questioned, and so on. (Just as this
characterization of the humanities would itself be questioned, which
would be questioned, and so on.) After the popularization of the
internet, the humanities initially focused on applying engineering
approaches to the humanities, by applying techniques from natural
language processing to texts. But in recent years it has also applied
humanities approaches to engineering [16, §1.2] [59, ch.1] where
the purpose is once again to ask good questions, not seek universal
answers8. This will be our inspiration.
Adversarial struggles require solutions to unique and unfore-
seen circumstances. Good methods account for this and generate
these solutions. Good meta-methods allow for the generation of
the appropriate meta-methods. Adversaries compete to do this best.
Even in a lull, researchers develop methods and theories, preparing
for those unforeseen con￿icts. Developing skill in their analyses
involves discussion with other researchers not just to transmit facts,
but also to judge the value of the way one is thinking analytically,
and learning new ways of thinking, strengthening conceptual abili-
ties for the next adversarial cycle. When con￿ict occurs, researchers
study the e￿ectiveness of their methods. They also question the
e￿ectiveness of their studies, in disentangling a method’s e￿ect on
the outcome, for example. Adversaries compete to do this best as
well. And so on.
This may seem overly abstract, so let’s consider an example.
Imagine two nations, near-peer rival powers. The cyber security
researchers of these nations develop technical solutions while stop-
ping online crimes, defending against industrial espionage, securing
critical infrastructure, and so on. They talk amongst and between
themselves, and with other nations, sharing various methods and
theories, and not sharing others.
Imagine these two nations become involved in an overt force-
on-force cyber-only con￿ict [60, pg.88,92-95]. The engineered en-
vironment, distorted by the con￿ict and having evolved under the
in￿uence of millions of consumers, is unlike that of any year past.
The combatant nations’ researchers apply their technical methods
in a variety of operations. Their ability to generate e￿ective tactics,
to invalidate their adversary’s tactics, to plan e￿ective operations
and meta-methodologically estimate their chance of success, etc.
are all enabled by the quality of their theories and the performative
abilities of their security personnel.
The con￿ict ends. The rival nations and others examine the con-
￿ict, identifying what happened and what caused it to happen that
way. Various theories are proposed, those are questioned, which
are themselves questioned and serve for new theories, and so on.
This example is highly simpli￿ed. Realistically, such a scenario
would also involve the in￿uence of activists, international busi-
nesses, criminals, knowledgable civilians, and so on, each reacting
in their own ways. However, it highlights the interaction between
technical, operational, and theoretical methods.
Practically speaking, this type of theorizing can be made part of
operations research, the ￿rst step of which is to perform an analysis
de￿ning the problem and constructing a model before applying the
appropriate method [73, pg.8-9]. Wargaming, optimization, capabil-
ity assessment are all a part of this. At this stage, when the methods
8Of course in doing so, humanist discussion produces material that may be useful in
a given context. Philosophy in particular is similar to “pure math,” which explores
relations and produces concepts and conclusions that may be useful in operational or
scienti￿c contexts, but whose main motivation is exploration, not utility [20].
are stated, so can a validation of the methods. The purpose is not to
provide unarguable answers. The purpose is to provide possibilities,
to support decision-making.
5 SUMMARY
In this paper we make several contributions relevant to the founda-
tional problem of validating methods in cyber security.
First, we provide precise de￿nitions of cyber security’s adver-
sarial, mechanistic, and contextual properties. This includes a deci-
sion tree to determine the adversarial characteristic of a method.
This now enables us to unambiguously discuss, for example, the
di￿erence between methods in adversarial and non-adversarial
disciplines, as well as phenomena such as adversarial shifts and
adversarial cycles.
Second, we build on these de￿nitions to describe three sets of
methods in cyber security: technical, operational, and theoretical.
Cyber security is inherently operational, so we describe various
types of cyber activities in terms of operations. We then describe a
well-considered theoretical meta-methodology. This now enables
us to state, for any technical method, what the validation needs
to accomplish: it should identify, detect, and react to potential
adversarial, contextual, and operational invalidations.
Third, we describe ways of validating theoretical methods. We
describe critical analytic and generative meta-methods, and provide
a scenario showing the role that theoretical methods would play
in an extended cyber con￿ict. This provides us with at least two
possible ways of further studying foundational principles.
The concepts we de￿ne are intuitive and some have been alluded
to in the literature. But they have not until now been precisely de-
￿ned in the form of a taxonomy and grounded in mature disciplines.
Because of the contextual nature of cyber security, we cannot pro-
vide a thorough listing of guaranteed ways of validating methods.
Instead we have provided a framework spanning from ￿rst princi-
ples to validation requirements to theoretical considerations, for
use by researchers and professionals in their given context. It turns
out that the best way to validate a method is not an algorithm, a
proof, or a technology. The best way to validate a method is people.
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